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COMMENTS
Ohio Mail and Visitation Prison Regulations
and the
Evolving Recognition of Prisoners' Rights
D YNAMIC CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED in recent years in the area of
prisoners' rights.' The antiquated view that prisoners were with-
out any rights - that prisoners were "slave [s] of the State' 2 -has
been replaced by the more progressive view that a prisoner retains
all rights of an ordinary citizen except those rights expressly or neces-
sarily taken from him by law. 3 As will be seen below, the areas of mail
rights and visitation rights have been particularly dynamic. 4
In light of the changing views regarding prisoners' rights, one
may wonder what the current Ohio regulations regarding mail and
visitation within prisons are; and more importantly, how well these
regulations have kept pace with the newly-evolving court decisions
on prisoners' rights. In considering these questions, the following dis-
cussion will selectively consider the Ohio Department of Rehabilita-
tion and Correction Administrative Regulations, paying attention only
to those considered of particular interest or those paralleling regula-
tions that have been the subject of litigation in other states. It should
be noted that there are few Ohio cases in the general area of prisoners'
rights. Consequently, most of the comparisons will be with standards
evolving in other jurisdictions.
1 Several factors have been offered as explanations for the recent dynamic nature of prisoners'
rights. These factors include the increased use of the 1871 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.
§1983), which was finally declared not to require exhaustion of state remedies in 1968; the
increased emphasis on inmate rehabilitation; the recent judicial trend to expand the consti-
tutional rights of disadvantaged groups including blacks, students, welfare recipients, service-
men, draftees, women, juveniles, and mental patients; the modification of habeas corpus
relief to include other more flexible remedies than "total release"; and the increased use of
federal courts because of the erosion of the "hands-off" and "federal abstention" doctrines.
See Hollen, Emerging Prisoners' Rights, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5-9 (1972).
2 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). The context of the quote
is as follows: "[A convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his
liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to
him. He is for the time being a slave of the State."
3Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cit. 1944). See also Morales v. Schmidt (7th Cit.
1973) (unreported) reproduced in S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISON-
ERS' RIGHTS-CASES AND MATERIALS 334 (1973).
4 See generally Brant, Prison Censorship Regulations Versus the Constitution: An Analysis,
19 LOYOLA L. REv. 25 (1972-73); Fox, The First Amendment Rights of Prisoners, 63 J.
CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 162 (1972): Hollen, Emerging Prisoners' Rights, 33 OHIO ST. L. J. 1
(1972); Note, Public and Press Rights of Access to Prisoners After Branzburg and Mandel.
82 YALE L. J. 1337 (1973); Comment, A Prisoner-Press Interview Right, 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 273 (1972); Comment, Judicial Recognition of Prisoners' Constitutional Right to
Send and Receive Mail, 76 DICK. L. REV. 775 (1971-72); Comment, Constitutional Law-
Prisoners' Rights, 6 IND. L. REv. 132 (1972).
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Incoming Mail - Administrative Regulation 814
A leading case considering the constitutional rights of incar-
cerated individuals relating to use of the mail was the 1970 case of
Palmigiano v. Travisono,5 decided by the Federal District Court of
Rhode Island. Palmigiano and other inmates of the "awaiting trial"
section of a Rhode Island prison brought a §1983 action6 alleging,
inter alia, that state prison officials arbitrarily and capriciously opened,
read, and censored incoming and outgoing mail, and that such actions
were unconstitutional.7
In considering whether to issue a temporary restraining order,
Judge Pettine identified the factors generally involved in prison cen-
sorship. Juxtaposed to the need for prison security and the need for
orderly administration were the prisoners' first amendment rights to
free speech and to petition for redress of grievances, the "outsider's"
first amendment right to free speech (to communicate with the in-
mate), and the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 8 In balancing these factors, the judge developed
certain standards which can be compared with Ohio prison regula-
tions relating to incoming mail.
Regarding the reading of incoming mail, paragraph 1 of Admin-
istrative Regulation 814 states, in effect, that there shall be no read-
ing, copying, or censorship of incoming first class letters, nor shall
there be any quantitative limits on incoming letters.' In comparing
this rule with the standards of Palmigiano, it appears that the Ohio
rule is somewhat more liberal. Palmigiano allowed reading of all in-
coming mail except that from an approved addressee listo (and ap-
parently that from public officials and attorneys) ; in contrast, the
Ohio rule generally prohibits all reading.
As a qualification to the general prohibition against the reading
of incoming first class mail, paragraph 7 of the Ohio regulation allows
such reading in special circumstances- where the Managing Officer
has "reasonable belief" that the writing constitutes "clear and im-
5 317 F.Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
7 317 F.Supp. at 780. Since constitutional rights were involved, the federal court had jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1962).
8 317 F.Supp. at 785-86, 791-92. It should also be noted that where the correspondence is be-
tween an inmate and his attorney during preparation for a criminal trial, the sixth amend-
ment right to effective counsel is involved. Id. at 789.
9 STATE OF OHIO, DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION & CORRECTION, ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION 814.
10 317 F.Supp. at 790. The justification for allowing the prison officials to read most incoming
mail was to allow the officials to check for hard core pornography and highly inflammatory
writings.
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minent danger to institutional security." To the extent this provision
allows the reading of mail from public officials or attorneys, the Ohio
regulation is more restrictive than the standards of Palmigiano which
allowed no such reading of this special category of mail.1 However,
the standards set forth in the Ohio case of Jones v. Wittenberg 2
allow the routine reading of all incoming mail for prisoners under
sentence. 3 Thus, even applied to mail from public officials and at-
torneys, paragraph 7 is not in conflict with existing Ohio case law,
although it does contrast with the standards of some other jurisdic-
tions as has already been noted.
Use of such language as "reasonable belief" and "imminent
danger to institutional security" suggests the possibility that this rule
could be subject to abuse. There are, however, various procedural
safeguards appearing in the rule. The authority to read letters in
these special circumstances can only be granted by the Director of
the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.1 4 The decision must
be based upon a written application from the Managing Officer docu-
menting his reasons for believing that the letter constitutes a clear
and imminent danger; the authority to read, when granted, is limited
to correspondence between the inmate and other specific persons and
is limited to a specific time period.
Regarding the mere inspection of incoming mail (in contrast to
reading or censorship discussed above), paragraph 2A of Ohio Ad-
ministrative Regulation 814 states, in effect, that all incoming mail
shall be opened and inspected for contraband except mail from courts,
attorneys, or public officials. This provision is identical to the standard
set forth in Palmigiano.'5 However, paragraph 2B goes on to allow
prison officials to inspect mail from courts, attorneys, or public of-
ficials whenever the inspection is made in the presence of the inmate-
addressee. This latter provision is more restrictive than Palmigiano,
where Judge Pettine did not authorize any such inspection of this
special mail. It should be noted, nevertheless, that Ohio case law does
support this provision, for the standards set forth in Jones v. Wit-
11 Id. at 788-89.
12 330 F.Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
13 1d. at 719.
14 STATE OF OHIO, DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION & CORRECTION, ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION 814, paragraph 7. It would appear that this authority can not be delegated,
since nothing is said about the Director's "designee." Contrast this fact with the authority
given to the Managing Officer "or his designee" by paragraph 3 of the same rule.
75 317 F.Supp. at 790. Rather persuasive testimony regarding the need for inspection of mail
was given by Mr. Ed W. Cass, Deputy Regional Director of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs, to the effect that one drop of an L.S.D. solution placed upon a piece
of paper could give a sixteen hour "trip" to a person (inmate) later ingesting that paper.
Id. at 783.
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tenberg16 allow inspection of all incoming letters or parcels for prison-
ers under sentence.11
Outgoing Mail- Administrative Regulation 814(a)
Regarding the justification for opening, reading, and censoring
outgoing mail, prison officials have argued that such measures are
necessary to protect the public from confidence schemes;18 to pro-
tect the public from criminal conspiracies between inmates and per-
sons on the outside;1" and to protect the outside community from
insulting, obscene, or threatening letters. 20 Juxtaposed to these factors
are the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, noted
earlier,21 and some aspects of the fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.2
Paragraph 1 of Administrative Regulation 814 (a) provides, gen-
erally, that first class letters shall not be opened, read, copied, or
censored. This general prohibition is qualified to allow such actions
where there is "clear and imminent danger to institutional security.
'23
These provisions are more restrictive than the standards of Pal-
migiano, which required a search warrant before outgoing first class
mail could be opened.24 This requirement of a search warrant was
based largely upon the fact that prison officials generally did not
monitor the conversations between inmates and visitors; since the
officials thereby implicitly conceded no compelling state interest for
monitoring conversations, there would not be a compelling state in-
terest for monitoring outgoing correspondence. 2 Although the Ohio
provision is more restrictive than Palmigiano, the provision is gen-
16 330 F.Supp. 707, 719 (N.D.Ohio 1971).
17 Id. at 719.
18 317 F.Supp. at 784. As an example of such a scheme, a prison official in Palmigiano cited an
instance in which a prisoner had attempted to send letters to parents of men killed in Viet
Nam, stating that he had known the son, had taken pictures of the son, and now needed
money to develop the pictures.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 786.
22 Id. at 791-92, although it was stated that the full sweep of the fourth amendment obviously
could not apply in a prison or jail context. Judge Pettine also noted the applicable signifi-
cance of the sixth amendment right to effective counsel in cases where the inmate and at-
torney are in the process of preparing for a criminal trial. Id. at 789.
2 This qualification is identical to the qualification discussed earlier regarding incoming first
class mail. The same requirement of "reasonable belief" and the same procedural safeguards
are applicable. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
2 317 F.Supp. at 791.
25 Id. But see Morales v. Schmidt (7th Cir. 1973) (unreported) reproduced in S. KRANTZ,
THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS-CASES AND MATERIALS 334
(1973) where a "reasonably necessary" test was advanced rather than the "compelling state
interest" test.
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erally compatible with other cases such as Woods v. Yeager 26 which
allowed prison officials to examine all outgoing correspondence unless
addressed to courts or to attorneys.27
Paragraph 2 states that there shall be no limits upon the number
of letters that an inmate may send and that there shall be no restric-
tions as to whom letters may be addressed. This provision is some-
what more liberal than the standards of Palmigiano which gave a
presumption of validity to the Rhode Island provision limiting cor-
respondence to an approved addressee list of seven persons. 28 Other
recent cases, however, have stated that an inmate has a right to send
mail to anyone without restriction as to length or volume.29 The Ohio
provision seems to reflect these more recent developments.
Paragraph 3A prohibits an inmate from sending obscene, threat-
ening, or "criminal letters. ' 3 This provision is not in conflict with
any case law, but one can wonder whether this provision is even
necessary. As described in the rule, such acts would already be pro-
hibited by existing law; furthermore, since there is generally no open-
ing and reading of outgoing mail anyway, one wonders how such a
rule can be effectively enforced.
Paragraph 3B prohibits an inmate from corresponding with any-
one not wishing to receive mail. Although no cases considering such a
provision could be found, one can question what overriding state in-
terest justifies such a rule.31
Publications - Administrative Regulation 814(b)
A key case dealing with the rights of an inmate to receive pub-
lications was the 1972 district court case of Laaman v. Hancock."
Laaman, an inmate at the New Hamphire State Prison, had sub-
scribed to a publication entitled the Strawberry Grenade and had
ordered a book entitled Guerrilla Warfare & Marxism. 3  The prison
26463 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1972).
7Id. at 224. The court, citing Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971), noted that
examination of correspondence not addressed to attorneys or the courts, is a reasonable exer-
cise of prison management discretion with which federal courts will not interfere. However,
even the Woods opinion does not support application of this Ohio provision to court or at-
torney mail.
1317 F.Supp. at 791. Judge Pettine allowed the presumption of validity so long as the criteria
used in the preparation of such lists were rationally related to the purposes of confinement
and to institutional security.
29 E.g., Lamar v. Kern, 349 F.Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Guajardo v. McAdams, 349 F.Supp.
211 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
30 Letters that contain the planning of criminal conduct, or letters whose contents would violate
federal or state law.
31 If the justification is merely to reduce the administrative burden of handling complaints, the
author seriously questions whether this constitutes a compelling state interest.
2351 F.Supp. 1265 (D. N.H. 1972).
3id. at 1267.
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Classification Committee, in reviewing these publications, found that
certain issues of the Strawberry Grenade and the book Guerrilla War-
fare & Marxism were "inciting and inflammatory."3 Consequently,
these materials were withheld from the inmate. 35 In its consideration
of the §1983 action36 brought by Laaman, the court developed certain
standards that can also be compared with the Ohio prison regulations
relating to publications.
Paragraph 3 of Administrative Regulation 814(b) provides that
obscene and inflammatory materials can be excluded from the insti-
tution. Publications are considered obscene if patently offensive to
prevailing community standards regarding sexual matters and utterly
devoid of redeeming social value. Publications are considered inflam-
matory if their presence would constitute a clear and present danger
of inciting criminal activity.
These Ohio regulations conform to the standards of Laaman pro-
vided procedural due process safeguards are met.37 Thus the manner
of determining whether a publication is obscene or inflammatory be-
comes very important.
Paragraph 5 describes the process by which such determinations
are made in Ohio. Publications are screened initially by the prison
mail office. Suspect publications are then forwarded to the Managing
Officer, or his designee, for review. If the Managing Officer considers
the publication obscene or inflammatory, he must forward the pub-
lication to the Screening Committee in Columbus, 38 and notify the
inmate of his actions. The inmate is afforded an opportunity to state
his arguments to the Committee in writing. The Committee then
makes its recommendations to the Director who makes the final de-
termination. If the publication is to be excluded, the inmate is so
advised in writing and the reasons for the exclusion are stated.39
34 Id.
35 Id.
-42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
37 Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F.Supp. 1265, 1268 (D. N.H. 1972). Regarding obscene materials,
however, there is at least an issue as to whether prison officials can properly interfere with
an inmate's mere possession (as opposed to sale) of obscene literature in light of the Su-
preme Court decision of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
3 The membership of the Ohio Publication Screening Committee is to include at least an at-
torney, a person experienced in the area of literature, a full-time departmental employee and
a non-departmental employee. Paragraph 4 of ADMIN. REG. 814 (b). This quest for diversity
comports with the Laaman suggestion that a screening committee be composed of psychiatric
experts, wardens, librarians, chaplains, and perhaps inmates. Laaman v. Hancock, 351
F.Supp. 1265, 1268 (D. N.H. 1972). One can wonder, however, whether the rationale for
using a single, broadly based, statewide committee to determine the issue of obscenity might
have been discredited by the recent case of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), with
its emphasis on local community standards of obscenity rather than national standards.
39 Note how the procedural due process requirements of notice, opportunity to object, and a
decision by an unbiased body, that were set forth in Sostre v. Otis, 330 F.Supp. 941 (S.D.
N.Y. 1971 ), are met point-by-point in the Ohio procedure.
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Generally, the above procedure compares favorably with
Laaman.40 There may, however, be a problem with time limits. Al-
though the Ohio procedure requires action within certain maximum
time periods at each step, when these time periods are cumulated it
seems that the final decision may not be reached until eighteen days
after the publication arrives. 41 Laaman, on the other hand, implied
that minimum due process would require a decision within seven days.42
Regarding the number of publications that can be received by an
inmate, paragraph 1 establishes the limitation of reasonableness. In
Laaman the limitation of reasonableness was upheld upon the justi-
fication that it limits the burden of examining incoming materials.
3
Attorneys' Visits - Administrative Regulation 815
Paragraph 1 of Administrative Regulation 815 discusses visits
by attorneys during regular visiting hours. It states that such visits
are to be allowed provided the attorney is the attorney of record for
the inmate, or that the attorney is visiting upon the request of the
inmate or his family.
The above provision is consistent with the recent Louisiana case
of Elie v. Henderson" wherein the court considered the refusal of the
warden to grant an attorney's request to interview some twenty-one
named inmates. Elie stated that reasonable restrictions upon attorney
consultations were permitted, such reasonable restrictions including
the requirement of a bonafide attorney-client relationship or the
requirement that the consultation be at the request of the inmate.
Paragraph 2 deals with visits on weekends or after regular visit-
ing hours during the week. It requires advance notice of any request
ranging from one day (in the case of a weekend visit), to a "reason-
able time" before the end of visiting hours (in the case of an extension
thereof). The provision also sets forth the policy that such requests
shall be "liberally" granted.
These notice conditions would most probably meet the "reason-
able restrictions" test of Elie, since the prison administration may
need time to find a place for the visit and to make the necessary secur-
ity arrangements for that place. The policy of "liberally" granting
requests, however, does imply a possible standards problem.
40See Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F.Supp. 1265, 1268-69 (D. N.H. 1972).
41 Mail office - 1 day, Managing Officer - 3 days, Screening Committee - 14 days. Paragraph
5 of ADMIN. REG. 814(b).
41 Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F.Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. N.H. 1972).
43 Id. at 1268.
" 340 F.Supp. 958 (E.D. La. 1972).
45 Id. at 968. Restrictions of this type are justified, at least in part, upon the ground that an at-
torney should not be allowed to solicit clients within the institution.
1974]
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Paragraph 4 provides for the curtailment or banning of visits
during a formally declared state of emergency at the institution. Dis-
cretionary exceptions are allowed if an inmate's court date is ap-
proaching or if the need for legal assistance was created by the emer-
gency itself. Assuming no abuse of discretion regarding the exceptions,
this provision seems compatible with the line of cases holding that
other constitutional rights can be curtailed during emergencies. 46
Paragraph 5 provides that conversations between the inmate and
attorney are not to be monitored. This provision comports with priv-
ileged communications arguments and is also consistent with the
rationale of cases holding that inmate-attorney mail cannot be read
or even opened.4
Paragraph 7 provides that the attorney may not visit over three
clients at any one time. This provision is somewhat more liberal than
the standard of Elie, that attorneys visit inmates only one at a time.A
News Media Visits and Interviews - Administrative Regulation 813
A key case in the news media area is the 1972 New York case of
Burnham v. Oswald49 wherein inmates of Attica and newsmen sought
a declaratory judgment regarding Attica rules and regulations pro-
hibiting private interviews between newsmen and inmates.50 In con-
sidering these rules and guidelines, the court laid down certain stand-
ards which can be compared with the Ohio regulations.5'
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Administrative Regulation 813 provide
that requests for visits (as distinguished from interviews) 2 with con-
senting inmates shall be granted unless there is a clear and present
danger to security, an unreasonable interference with orderly admin-
istration, or danger to reporters. These standards for press visits
comport almost verbatim with the standards for interviews enumer-
ated in Burnham.1
3
OSee, e.g., Burnham v. Oswald, 333 F.Supp. 1128 (W.D. N.Y. 1971), which upheld Attica's
exclusion of newsmen during the 1971 riot.
4 E.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F.Supp. 776, 789 (D.R.I. 1970).
48 Elie v. Henderson, 340 F.Supp. 958, 968 (E.D. La. 1972).
41342 F.Supp. 880 (W.D. N.Y. 1972).
"oId. at 883.
51 The court noted the interest of the press in full and accurate reporting, the right of the pris-
oner to communicate with the press, and the right of the public to know what goes on within
prison walls. Id. at 885-86. The court then held that the state interests in security, discipline,
and orderly administration were insufficient to justify absolute administrative discretion over
interviews. Id. at 887.
52 The distinction seems to be that interviews involve a planned meeting for a particular pur-
pose in which the interviewer is able to enumerate specific inquiries in advance. A visit, on
the other hand, is more informal with discussion occurring more or less spontaneously.
53 342 F.Supp. 880, 887 (W.D. N.Y. 1972). Burnham did not mention the "danger to re-
porters" exception, but Burnham did mention an additional exception where the inmate
had clearly abused his right of access to the press. Id.
[Vol. 23 :109
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Regarding personal interviews of specific inmates, paragraph 5A
provides that such interviews will be allowed upon the approval of
the inmate and his attorney of record if legal action is pending, and
upon the approval of the Managing Officer. Paragraph 5B then pro-
vides that the Managing Officer shall approve an interview unless
there would be detrimental effects upon the inmate or other inmates,
unless legal action or parole review is pending, unless the interview
would present a clear and present danger to security, or unless the
interview would disrupt the orderly administration of the institution.
These provisions regarding interviews are more restrictive than
the Burnham standards noted above - more restrictive in the sense
that the Managing Officer is given broader discretion to deny the re-
quest. On the other hand, the Ohio provision is more liberal than some
cases which have concluded that the denial of a press interview is
completely within the discretion of prison officials, the rationale being
that a prisoner's ability to correspond with the press sufficiently sat-
isfies any constitutional rights involved.5
Paragraph 5D provides that interviews may not be verbally
monitored. This Ohio provision is more lenient than the Burnham
standard. Burnham permitted verbal monitoring of the interview
and set forth as the only safeguard the requirement that there be
no reprisals because of anything said by the inmate.15
Paragraph 5E provides for an appeal to the Director in the event
an interview is denied. This provision is similar to the requirement
of Burnham that either a newsman or an inmate aggrieved by an ad-
verse decision be given an opportunity to appeal.5 6 The Ohio provisions
are silent, however, on the matter of notice to the inmate that a
request for an interview has been made; Burnham, on the other hand,
required such notice.5 7
Regarding the suspension of visiting and interviewing rights,
paragraph 5F allows such a suspension during a state of emergency.
54E.g., Smith v. Bounds, Civil No. 2914 (E.D. N.C., Mar. 10, 1972) cited in S. KRANTZ, THE
LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS -CASES AND MATERIALS 405 (1973).
The Ohio provision should also be compared with federal prison policy prohibiting press
interviews. Although the court in Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F.Supp. 770
(1972) found that the absolute ban on interviews was unjustified, the later case of Seattle-
Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Daggett, Civil No. 9557 (W.D. Wash., May 5, 1972) upheld
the federal policy, stating that prisoners have no right to a press interview where press
visits were allowed. Comment, A Prisoner-Press Interview Right, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
273, 279-80 (1972).
ssBurnham v. Oswald, 342 F.Supp. 880, 889 (W.D. N.Y. 1972). In justifying the monitoring
of interviews, the Burnham court relied upon Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 202-03 (2d
Cit. 1971), where the court held that the risk of plotting escapes or transferring contraband
justified opening and reading all inmates' mail. Burnham, supra at 889.
s 342 F.Supp. at 888.
5 Id.
1974]
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This provision is consistent with the earlier case of Burnham v.
Oswald,s which upheld Attica's exclusion of newsmen during the
riot of 1971.
General Visiting - Administrative Regulation 810
With regard to the standards for general visitation, few cases
considering this area can be found. A recent study also notes that
courts have generally placed no limitation upon an official's discre-
tion to grant or deny general visitation.5 In light of the scarcity of
judicially-created standards in this area, 0 some of the Ohio regula-
tions will be compared to visitation regulations proposed in 1973 by
the Boston University Center for Criminal Justice.61
Paragraph 2 of Administrative Regulation 810 provides for the
establishment of an approved visitors list for each inmate. The Model
Rules and Regulations also include a provision for an approved
visitors list.62 Paragraph 3 provides that family members and four
friends may be placed upon the approved list. Similarly, the Model
Rules and Regulations allow for family and friends, but they place
no quantitative limits on the number of friends.6 3
Paragraph 4 provides for the exclusion of a visitor where there
is reasonable ground to believe the visit would create "clear and prob-
able danger" to security, that the visitor has a past record of dis-
ruptive conduct, that the visitor is under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, that the visitor is directly related to the inmate's prior criminal
behavior, that the visit will be detrimental to the inmate's rehabilita-
tion, or where the visitor refuses to submit to search or show proper
identification. The provision goes on to state, inter alia, that the mere
51333 F.Supp. 1128 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
59 Hollen, Emerging Prisoners' Rights, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 65 (1972). See Walker v. Pate, 356
F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966), where the prison officials were allowed to prevent visits by a pris-
oner's wife who had a criminal record; United States ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F.Supp.
637 (E.D. Pa. 1967) where prison officials were allowed to deny visiting privileges to pris-
oners on death row. But see Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F.Supp. 257 (D. Neb. 1971), wherein
the court noted that the arbitrary and capricious application of existing visiting regulations
would not be allowed.
60 The lack of standards in this area probably occurs because the courts have generally failed to
consider general visitation privileges to be constitutional rights. E.g., Rowland v. Wolff, 336
F.Supp. 257 (D. Neb. 1971), where Judge Urbom stated "I am confident that the plaintiff
has no constitutional right to visitation from his sisters." Contrast this situation regarding
general visitation with press and attorney visitation where obvious first and sixth amendment
rights are involved. It should be noted, however, that to the extent prisoners have rights to
rehabilitation and to the extent visitation with family and friends is essential to rehabilita-
tion, there may be grounds for developing standards in this area.
6 1 
BOSTON U. CENTER FOR GRIM. JUSTICE, MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS ON PRISON-
ERS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1973). [The applicable regulations are reproduced
in S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS -C ASES AND MATE-
RIALS 409-10 (1973)].
62 Id. REGULATION Ic-6.c.
63 Id.
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fact that the visitor is a convicted felon will not be reason alone for
excluding the visitor.64 Generally, these Ohio provisions compare well
with the spirit of the Model Rules and Regulations. 65
Conclusion
For the most part, the mail and visitation regulations promul-
gated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction com-
pare favorably with the newly evolving recognition of prisoners'
rights. In a few instances the Ohio regulations are even more liberal
than the standards set forth in the most recent cases. These more
liberal regulations include Paragraph 1 of Administrative Regulation
814 which generally prohibits the reading of all incoming first class
letters (in the absence of clear and imminent danger to institutional
security), rather than merely prohibiting the reading of mail from an
approved list; and Paragraph 5D of Administrative Regulation 813
which prohibits news media interviews from being verbally monitored.
There are some instances, however, where the Ohio regulations
are more restrictive than would be acceptable under recent decisions
in other jurisdictions. These more restrictive provisions include para-
graph 2B of Administrative Regulation 814, which allows inspection
of attorney-client mail if the inspection is in the presence of the in-
mate; paragraph 7 of Administrative Regulation 814, which provides
a clear and imminent danger test for the reading of mail from public
officials and attorneys, rather than prohibiting all reading of this
special category of mail; paragraph 1 of Administrative Regulation
814 (a), which incorporates a clear and imminent danger test for
opening outgoing first class mail, rather than requiring a search war-
rant; and paragraph 5C of Administrative Regulation 813, relating
to the conditions warranting the exclusion of press interviews. Never-
theless, even these more restrictive provisions are not in conflict with
court decisions of this jurisdiction at the present time.
The fact that Ohio mail and visitation prison regulations gen-
erally compare favorably with the requirements of prisoners' rights
case law may be viewed with favor or disfavor depending upon one's
perspective. If one accepts the role of prisons in Ohio's correctional
system, then one may look upon the seemingly up-to-date regulations
as a sign of progress and health within these institutions. On the
other hand, if one takes the view that the prison as an entity no
longer has a place in any progressive correctional system, and that
prisons must ultimately be completely replaced by other approaches
such as community-based corrections, then one may view the up-to-
The Ohio provision is more lenient than some provisions that have been upheld such as that
in Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966), where a wife was excluded solely because
of her past criminal record.
65 See MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 61, REGULATION Ic - 6.d.
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date regulations as "boiler plate" which simply make an already anti-
quated institution more immune from attack through the courts.
Finally, regardless of one's perspective, the real issue is whether
or not prisoners' rights are adequately recognized in practice, not
whether or not they are recognized in administrative regulations.
Thus, the conclusion that Ohio prison regulations regarding mail and
visitation seem to recognize the newly evolving rights of prisoners is
a rather hollow conclusion in itself, unless the spirit and intent of
the regulations are present in actual practice within the high walls
of Ohio prisons."
Donald L. Uchtmannt
Appendix
Mr. Christopher Conybeare of the Catholic-Lutheran-Episcopal-
Methodist (CLEM) Justice Project has maintained some contact with
inmates in state institutions although his principal emphasis relates
to municipal and county institutions. Regarding state institutions, his
general comment was that interpretation and application of the fore-
going regulations is, in the final analysis, left to individuals, and that
much depends upon their attitude and personality regardless of what
the regulations may say in fact. Regarding letters, Mr. Conybeare
specifically stated that during the past three months he had mailed
three letters to one inmate of Lucasville who had been critical of the
institution; none of these letters had been received. Also, three or four
letters had been sent from the inmate to Mr. Conybeare during that
period, but only one had been received.
Ms. Jo Ann Bray of the Peoples' Bussing Program, Inc. of Cleve-
land has had contact with prison visitation policies as a result of her
work in organizing the bussing of visitors from population centers
to the prisons. In addition to the problem of visitation caused by re-
moteness (a problem made even more acute by the fuel crisis and gas-
less Sundays), Ms. Bray noted that the proper identification provision
of paragraph 4D, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 810 can be a problem.
She related one incident where a Cleveland man travelled to Lucas-
ville but was not allowed to visit because the correction official re-
fused to accept the driver's license presented as identification, saying
"that's not good enough." She stated generally that problems with
visitation often depend upon "who was calling the shots" on any par-
ticular day; and that whenever abuses are brought to the attention of
supervisors it was easy for the supervisor to explain that the officer
6In an attempt to gain insight into actual practices within Ohio prisons, the author conducted
several interviews with persons having repeated contact with Ohio prisons within the past
year. Summaries of these interviews are reported in the following appendix.
t Law Review Editor; third year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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had just been "over-zealous" or had simply "gotten the wrong im-
pression." Ms. Bray did comment that conversations generally were
not monitored, and that there was a positive trend toward less
troublesome visitation.
Mr. Hal Steinhart has had contact with prison censorship policies
through his endeavors as editor of the Ohio Connections, the short-
lived, first state-wide prison newspaper which had its birth and
death during 1973. Mr. Steinhart indicated that Ohio Connections had
been censored to some extent in state institutions at Lebanon, Marys-
ville, and Chillicothe, and that delivery was delayed at Lucasville. A
witness in the mail room at Chillicothe reportedly stated that the
newspaper issues were destroyed in the mail room without being
screened according to the procedure of paragraph 5E, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE REGULATION 814 (b). Mr. Steinhart also stated that some of the
inmate subscribers who never received the issues did not receive notice
of confiscation as is also specifically required by paragraph 5B.
Mr. R. Raymond Twohig of Columbus, Ohio, has had contact with
prison practices as one of the few Ohio attorneys involved in prison-
ers' rights litigation and as an activist in the organization of prison-
ers' unions. Generally, Mr. Twohig is of the opinion that the OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION REGULATIONS were
written for "public consumption." In the area of mail, he indicated
that prisoners generally feel that all mail is being read, that such
opinions are partly the result of the ever-present atmosphere of dis-
trust engulfing the inmates and prison officers, and that it is difficult
to pinpoint just what does take place. Mr. Twohig was the attorney
for, and a party to correspondence dealing with, the Ohio Prison
Labor Union and was of the opinion that a great deal of this cor-
respondence had either been read or xeroxed, for a prison adminis-
trator introduced much of this correspondence as exhibits before a
Congressional committee. Regarding the screening of publications,
Mr. Twohig noted that publications were being withheld; black liter-
ature composed the greater part of the screened publications and Mr.
Twohig was skeptical as to whether such material could honestly be
called "inciting."
Regarding press interviews and visits, Mr. Twohig made the gen-
eral comment that such media access to Ohio prisons is typically
unavailable whenever anything newsworthy develops. He noted that
paragraph 2 of ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 813, which provides in
part that news media can be excluded whenever the visit would
endanger the safety of the reporter, was a barrier to news media
access. He also pointed out that paragraph 5A, which requires at-
torney approval for a personal interview, can be particularly trouble-
some. For example, in Lucasville, almost all the inmates compose a
class of plaintiffs in a single pending suit; thus, hardly a single in-
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mate can be interviewed without the specific consent of the attorneys
handling that action.
Regarding visits by attorneys, Mr. Twohig commented that he
had personally had some difficulty getting approval for weekend visits,
the policy of "liberally" granting requests notwithstanding. He also
was of the opinion that the provisions banning attorney visits during
emergencies had been abused: he contrasted the lengthy eighteen day
emergency in Lucasville during 1973 (May and June - a time when
prisoners were in their cells and order was being maintained) with
the legitimate emergency lasting only a few days in Attica during
1971 (a time when the prison was actually in the hands of the
inmates).
As a final comment, Mr. Twohig noted that even if the visitation
and mail regulations have been promulgated in good faith by the De-
partment, there remains the problem of effectively changing the habits
and practices of guards and administrators who had done things the
"old way" for many, many years.
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